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A DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF AMICUS ADVOCACY
RUBEN J. GARCIA*
ABSTRACT
Amicus curiae ("friend of the court) participation in litigation has
flourished in recent years as many groups and individuals seek to in-
fluence the outcome of litigation. Amicus filers are not parties and
judges have wide discretion to reject amicus briefs if they believe that
the amicus participation does not add anything to the briefs already
filed by the parties. In three recent cases, Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Richard Posner has rejected amicus filings and prom-
ised to closely scrutinize applications to file amicus briefs in the fu-
ture. Judge Posner's influence has led an increasing number of
judges, primarily at the district court level, to deny leave to file
amicus briefs.
This Article argues for the importance of amicus participation in a
democratic system. The Article proposes changes to the federal appel-
late standards for granting leave to file amicus briefs. Currently,
court rules generally require that amicus briefs add something new to
the arguments already made by the parties. This Article argues that
the standards for sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure should determine whether amicus briefs should be accepted for
filing. This standard might increase the number of amicus briefs that
are accepted for filing, but would also increase democratic participa-
tion in the court system. While placing some limits on amicus partici-
pation is important to the proper functioning of the judicial system,
this Article argues that limits on amicus participation should be
minimal in light of the democratic and constitutional values that
amicus participation furthers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Amicus curiae' (herein "amicus" or "amici") briefs have become a
regular part of the litigation process. Indeed, these briefs filed by
nonparties to litigation have become so common that some judges are
looking for ways to limit them. In a 2003 Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals opinion, Judge Richard Posner denied leave to file an amicus
brief and cited the following reasons:
[Jiudges have heavy caseloads and therefore need to minimize ex-
traneous reading; amicus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be
used to make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the
length of parties' briefs; the time and other resources required for
the preparation and study of, and response to, amicus briefs drive
up the cost of litigation; and the filing of an amicus brief is often
an attempt to inject interest group politics into the federal appeals
process. 2
As Judge Posner's exasperated tone indicates, amicus briefs have
flourished as a part of the litigation process. A recent study of amicus
activity in the United States Supreme Court found that amicus briefs
were filed in only 39% of the cases during the Warren Court (1953-
1969) and 67.5% of the cases in the Burger Court (1969-1986). 3 By
1. According to Black's Law Dictionary: "[Latin 'friend of the court] A person who is
not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a
brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.... Of-
ten shortened to amicus.... Also termed friend of the court. P1. amici curiae." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2000) and Ryan v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997)).
3. JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD McLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS
AMicus CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 28 (2005).
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contrast, amicus briefs were filed in 83% of U.S. Supreme Court
cases from 1986 to 1997.1
Amicus briefs are filed by persons or groups not directly involved
in the litigation. All courts impose some limits on whether amicus
briefs may be filed.5 Despite the historical roots and proliferation of
amicus participation in recent years, the practice is looked at with
suspicion by some observers.6 Judge Posner's influence on the law
merits a closer examination of why we have amicus participation in
our democratic system.7
This Article offers a normative defense of amicus participation, in
light of its important role in the legal profession and in a democratic
judicial system. The amicus brief is a form of speech and petition, to
which the courts should give due consideration.8 The use of amicus
briefs to petition the government is especially important for constitu-
tional issues since the judiciary is empowered to interpret the Con-
stitution. The goal of this Article is to guide judicial discretion in fa-
vor of broad acceptance of amicus briefs, rather than the narrow view
espoused by Judge Posner and other detractors who view amicus
briefs as nefarious interest group activity.
Much of the scholarship on amicus briefs has described how the
courts make decisions and the impact of amicus participation on
4. Id.
5. For example, Supreme Court Rule 37 states: "An amicus curiae brief that brings
to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not
serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored." SuP. CT. R. 37(1).
6. Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or Nuisances?, 33 LITIG. 5
(2006), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=3144&nid=6
(describing the recent trend of courts in limiting or rejecting amicus briefs); Andrew P.
Morriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law
Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823 (1999) (expressing concern about the help-
fulness of amici in Supreme Court employment cases); John Harrington, Note, Amici Cu-
riae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
667 (2005) (arguing that most amicus briefs are not helpful to courts and should be lim-
ited).
7. Judge Posner is a prolific author of both judicial opinions and legal scholarship in
a number of areas ranging from law and economics to pragmatism and security policy. His
most recent books deal with the government's prosecution of terrorism post-9/1l. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006); RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM (2006). For scholarship examining the influence of
Judge Posner on the law, see, for example, Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge
Richard A Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82-Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion
Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2000); see also Pro-
ject Posner, http://www.projectposner.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (searchable database
of Judge Posner's decisions).
8. Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Ex-
pression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835 (2002).
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those decisions.9 These articles focused on empirical data document-
ing the rise in amicus participation in courts at all levels over the
last thirty years. 10 Courts have generally allowed amicus briefs to be
filed, and several studies have tried to measure their effectiveness
and impact. This Article, building on previous studies revealing that
amicus briefs have some impact on judicial decisionmaking," will fo-
cus on the normative question of how courts ought to decide whether
to grant leave to file amicus briefs. This Article places the amicus
brief in historical, constitutional, and institutional contexts to argue
for a broader standard for courts to accept the filing of amicus briefs.
Further, this Article argues that judges may have an ethical duty to
give fair consideration to all amicus briefs filed.
This Article also argues that amicus litigation has an expressive
function that may be protected by the Constitution. Research on the
efficacy of litigation as a social movement strategy continues to pro-
duce divergent results.12 Some activists argue that engaging in litiga-
tion diverts movement resources away from needed work in other
arenas, such as legislative or grassroots organizing work. 13 Others
point to the need for litigation to shape the goals of social move-
ments.14 Regardless of the efficacy of the litigation, it is clear that
many social movements use the courts to send messages about their
goals. Rather than initiating lawsuits for this purpose, many groups
are utilizing amicus curiae status to get their messages into the pub-
lic domain. The amicus brief is typically the only court appearance
allowed by a nonparty to litigation.
9. See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963) (discussing that amicus curiae briefs can, among other things,
provide factual information to the court and point out implications of the court's ruling).
10. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Cu-
riae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 807, 810-16
(2004) (analyzing why amicus briefs are effective); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743, 751-56 (2000) (exploring amici curiae activity to the Supreme Court in the last fifty
years).
11. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court:
Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990); Donald R. Songer &
Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation in the
Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993).
12. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
13. LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985) (examining the use of amicus cu-
riae briefs by conservative interest groups); Christopher Coleman et al., Social Movements
and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 663, 666-67 (2005) (critiquing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)).
14. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin
After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1258-65 (1992) (arguing for a limit on
court discretion to allow the amicus curiae device).
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The burden on lawyers' First Amendment rights by court sanc-
tions and bar discipline is frequently justified by lawyers' role as offi-
cers of the court.15 As officers of the court, attorneys are ethically
bound not to clog the courts' docket with frivolous litigation, and also
to display candor to the tribunal. 16 Because amicus briefs are often
used by organized groups to send a message to legislatures, courts,
and the public rather than to achieve a particular result, the "officer
of the court" function is in tension with free speech. 17 This Article
does not argue for an abolition of the limits on the filing of amicus
briefs. Instead, the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 11, usually used to sanction parties, can provide a better"gatekeeper" function to decide which briefs should be accepted for
filing than the current rules on amicus participation.18
This Article places the right to file amicus briefs within the First
Amendment right to petition. 9 Although the First Amendment's Pe-
tition Clause and its language "for the redress of grievances" seems
to require that the citizenry have something approaching the stand-
ing required by Article III of the Constitution, this is inconsistent
with common usage of the petition clause in town halls and public
meetings and congressional hearings. 21
The amicus brief is an institutional part of U.S. court systems,
serving to broaden the transparency and democratic legitimacy in
the courts. I argue in this Article that the courts should give fair con-
sideration to amicus briefs unless they are plainly sanctionable. 21
15. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers'First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1998).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1-3.4 (2003).
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the
First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 872-74 (1998) (arguing that lower scrutiny of re-
strictions on lawyer speech is an unconstitutional condition on bar membership); W. Brad-
ley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 357-59 (2001) (exam-
ining the consistency of lawyers' diminished speech rights with ethical obligations).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
19. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme
Court Litigation: Appraisal of Hakman's 'Folklore", 16 LAw & Soc. REV. No. 2, 311 (1981)
(testing Hakman's 1956 argument that amicus parties are not engaging in interest group
activity); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of
Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 35 (1983) (finding that the
Supreme Court rarely rejects amicus briefs, but the influence of amici on Court decisions is
variable).
20. Michael J. Harris, Note, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship
in American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1 (2000) (expressing con-
cern about "litigating amici").
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) requires attorneys and parties submitting to the court to cer-
tify "to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances" that:
(1) [the paper presented to the court] is not being presented for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or need-
lessly increase the cost of litigation;
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Moreover, the amicus brief is an important part of "deliberative de-
mocracy," a theory that favors fully informed debate as a condition to
democratic society.22
In Part II of this Article, I survey the use and potential abuse of
amicus participation. Then, in Part III, I will discuss the First
Amendment values that amicus participation furthers. Next, in Part
IV, this Article furthers a theoretical framework that places amicus
participation in a democratic court system. Finally, in Part V, I sug-
gest a standard for accepting amicus briefs that will both make it
easier to file amicus briefs and also reduce some of the abuses that
amicus participation might raise. As I will discuss, this Article ar-
gues for a liberalization of amicus standards because of the constitu-
tional, ethical, and democratic implications of amicus participation.
The main tenet of this Article is that amicus participation plays
an important role in the democratic process. This Article views the
amicus brief not just as an element of interest group lobbying in to-
day's society-even though it might have that purpose or effect-but
rather as an integral part of participatory democracy. A review of
Judge Posner's writings confirms that his suspicion of amicus briefs
may be related to his theories regarding the nature of democracy. 23
Moreover, amicus participation, because it is rooted in the right to
petition, is an integral part of social movements. For all these rea-
sons, courts should be liberal in granting leave to file amicus briefs.
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable op-
portunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Id.
22. Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1877-78
(2006); David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strate-
gic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437
(1993); Ethan J. Lieb, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903,
904 (2006).
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOcRAcY 16-18 (2003) (arguing in
favor of Schumpeterian democracy over deliberative democracy).
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II. FRIENDLY FIRE: DIFFERING APPROACHES TO AMICUS BRIEFS
A. Federal Court Rules: "Does the Brief Add Anything New?"
1. A Summary of Amicus Rules
Although amicus participation dates to Roman law, court rules
regulating amici are a relatively recent phenomenon. 24 Amicus rules
vary in different courts, but a common theme is the requirement to
avoid repeating arguments made by the parties. 5 Since promulgat-
ing its first amicus rule in 1937, the United States Supreme Court
has increasingly placed limits on amicus participation but rarely ever
rejects amicus briefs.26 The number of amicus briefs filed in the U.S.
Supreme Court began increasing in the 1980s.2 7 In the 1989 Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services case, over eighty amicus briefs were
filed involving 5,469 groups and individuals. 2 In 2003, a total of
eighty-two briefs were filed in the two cases arising from the Univer-
sity of Michigan's affirmative action policies, Gratz v. Bollinger and
Grutter v. Bollinger.29
United States Supreme Court Rule 37 states that an amicus brief
"that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already
brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to
the Court.' '30 All other briefs that do not serve to bring new, relevant
matters to the Court are a burden and their filing is disfavored.3 ' Su-
preme Court Rule 9 requires all filings, with the exception of certain
24. MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 3, at 3-5. McLauchlan notes that under Roman and
English law, amici were often solicited by the court. Id. at 3. McLauchlan traces voluntary
participation at least to 1695, when a Member of Parliament informed the court of his in-
terpretation of a statute the court was construing. Id. at 4 (citing Horton v. Ruesby, Comb,
(1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B.)); Krislov, supra note 9, at 695.
25. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (challenging race based ad-
missions at the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts); Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (challenging race based admissions at the Uni-
versity of Michigan's law school).
26. A Westlaw search in the Supreme Court database (SCT) of "reject! /3 amic!"
yielded no results.
27. See tLAUCHLAN, supra note 3, at 6.
28. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
29. Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You've Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned
from the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503 (2004) (dis-
cussing the roles of various amici-including the military, ethnic groups, the government,
and professional organizations-and their influence in the Michigan cases). For a compila-
tion of the numerous amicus briefs, see University of Michigan, Admissions Lawsuits,
Grutter and Gratz- Amicus Briefs, http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/
amicus.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
30. SUP. CT. R. 37(1).
31. Id.
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specified actions by prisoners, to be brought by a member of the Su-
preme Court bar. 32
Amicus rules in the federal circuit courts of appeal generally fol-
low the same pattern as the U.S. Supreme Court rules. Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-which provides a template for
the court rules of individual circuits-requires leave of court or the
consent of all the parties to the filing of the brief.33 The theory behind
this rule seems to be that the actual parties in the lawsuit (plaintiffs,
defendants, and intervenors) have a right to decide whether to allow
an outsider to muddy the waters. Moreover, there would seem to be
strong disincentives for the existing parties to litigation to consent to
the filing of an amicus brief that is contrary to their positions, thus
necessitating leave of court in most cases. 4
Individual circuits can adopt variations to the rules.3 5 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, discourages the filing of "mul-
tiple amici curiae briefs raising the same points in support of one
party. '36 Instead of filing briefs, parties are directed to file a "short
letter" stating their agreement with factual or legal statements made
32. SuP. CT. R. 9(1). Admission to the Supreme Court bar is generally open to attor-
neys admitted to the bar of any state for at least thee years and in good standing. SUP. CT.
R. 5(1).
33. FED. R. App. P. 29(a); David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old
Friends, 25 LITIG. 25 (1999); Tony Mauro, Court Gets a Tad Less Friendly to Amici, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 10.
34. Federal district courts have also seen an increase in the number of amicus briefs
filed in recent years. Cf. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does
the Party Begin After the Friends Leave? 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1243, 1256 (1992) (noting that
amicus participation "commonly" appears at all levels of the federal court system). State
courts have varying rules for amicus briefs. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.204(b) (affidavit must
state the nature of the applicant's interest and set forth facts or questions of law that have
not adequately been presented by the parties and their relevancy to the disposition of the
case); ILL. ST. S. CT. R. 345, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/
ArtIIIIArtIII.htm#345 (applicants must state their interest and how the brief will assist
the court).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 29. D.C. CIR. LOCAL R. 29(a) ('The brief must avoid repe-
tition of facts or legal arguments made in the principal (appellant/petitioner or appel-
lee/respondent) brief and focus on points not made or adequately elaborated upon in the
principal brief, although relevant to the issues before this court."); 3D CIR. LOCAL R. 29.1
("Before completing the preparation of an amicus brief, counsel for an amicus curiae shall
attempt to ascertain the arguments that will be made in the brief of any party whose posi-
tion the amicus is supporting, with a view to avoiding any unnecessary repetition or re-
statement of those arguments in the amicus brief."); 5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 29.2 ("The brief
should avoid the repetition of facts or legal arguments contained in the principal brief and
should focus on points either not made or not adequately discussed in those briefs."); 5TH.
CIR. LOCAL R. 29.4 ("After a panel opinion is issued, amicus curiae status will not be per-
mitted if the allowance would result in the disqualification of any member of the panel or
of the en banc court."); 9TH CIR. R. 29-1, CiR. ADV. COMM. NOTE ('CThe filing of multiple
amici curiae briefs raising the same points in support of one party is disfavored."); 10TH
CIR. LOCAL R. 29.1 ("The court will receive but not file proposed amicus briefs on rehear-
ing.").
36. CIR. ADVISORY CoMM., NOTE TO R. 29-1, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
ca9/Documents.nsf/c9254affb51940d288257316006b454d/$FILEOFRAP T0707.pdf.
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in the other parties' briefs. Most of the other variations in circuit
court rules simply caution amicus filers not to repeat arguments al-
ready made by the parties.37
Sometimes, courts reach out to experts to file amicus briefs.3 8 The
Federal Circuit, for example, maintains a list of bar and other asso-
ciations which will be invited to file briefs when the court directs.39
The Supreme Court regularly invites the Solicitor General of the
United States to submit the views of the federal government in the
form of amicus briefs, and no leave of court is required for the Solici-
tor General to file an amicus brief.40 Often litigants file a brief on be-
half of no party, but file instead for the court's benefit and to discuss
the broader implications of the court's ruling.41 Thus, amicus briefs
can serve important functions for the courts.
State and federal trial courts have received an increasing number
of amicus briefs in recent years, but they do not generally have sepa-
rate rules on the acceptance of amicus briefs, and instead follow the
rules of the appeals courts. 42 Perhaps because of the increasing num-
ber of briefs being filed, more and more district courts are taking
their leads from appellate decisions such as those written by Judge
Posner.43 An increasing number of amicus briefs are being filed in
state supreme courts and intermediate appellate courts as well.
These courts generally have rules about the filing of amicus briefs
that mirror the federal courts. 44
37. See id. Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes Troubled Relationship Between Courts and
Their 'Triends" 24 LITIG. 24 (1998).
38. FED. R. APP. P. 21(b)(4) allows for federal courts of appeal to invite amicus curiae
briefs from U.S. District Courts in mandamus proceedings. A recent example occurred in a
case involving the criminal tax prosecution of KPMG. Brief of U.S. District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan as Amicus Curiae, Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007), available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof-blog/fales/kaplan_:brief.pdf.
39. FED. CIR. R. 29(b) ('The clerk will maintain a list of bar associations and other or-
ganizations to be invited to file amicus curiae briefs when the court directs. Bar associa-
tions and other organizations will be placed on the list if they request. The request must be
renewed annually not later than October 1.").
40. SuP. CT. R. 37(4). Leave of court is also not required for an authorized law officer
of a state, county, city, or town. Id.
41. SUP. CT. R. 37(3)(a) (allowing amicus briefs to be filed on behalf of either party).
42. Animal Prot. Inst. v. Martin, No. CV-06-128 BW, 2007 WL 647567, at *3 (D. Me.
Feb. 23, 2007) (following Judge Alito's approach); Triad Int'l Maint. Corp. v. S. Air Transp.,
Inc., No. 2:04-CV-1200, 2005 WL 1917512, at *1-3. (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2005) (applying
Fed. R. App. P. 29 in a bankruptcy court appeal); U.S. v. Alkaabi, 223 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592-
93 (D.N.J. 2002) (following the 3d Circuit's application of Fed. R. App. P. 29).
43. See Cobell v. Norton, 246 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting an amicus
brief by an Indian tribe on the ground that doing so would encourage other tribes to ex-
pand the already "extensive record in the case'); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25,
33 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying the ACLU's motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of
the government on the ground that the United States was "more than adequately repre-
sented").
44. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.200(c)(1), 8.520(0(1) ("any person" may file an application
for amicus participation).
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Many courts also have similar procedures for requesting permis-
sion to file amicus briefs.45 The rules often require the amicus party
to file a proposed brief so the court can evaluate it before deciding
whether to allow the brief to be filed. 46 Some courts require the
amicus party to obtain consent of all the parties before an amicus
brief may be filed.47 Most courts also require a statement of economic
interests with all filings, to determine whether or not judges on the
court have to recuse themselves. 48
The current standard for most amicus briefs-whether the pro-
posed brief provides duplicative material-is too vague and indeter-
minate to give enough guidance for amicus filers to know whether or
not their filings are welcome. For judges to apply the current rules
faithfully, they might need to comb through the briefs to determine
whether the amicus briefs add anything new to the case. The prob-
lem is that the judge would need to go through the briefs in order to
determine this, which seems like a waste of scarce judicial resources.
Perhaps this is the reason that many amicus briefs are accepted for
filing. As I will describe in Part V, a new standard is needed to make
clearer when amicus briefs should be accepted and make it more
likely that they will be accepted.
2. Amicus Briefs and the Courts'Power to Sanction
Federal judges have broad authority to regulate what is filed in
their courts.49 FRCP 11 provides for sanctions against parties, their
attorneys, or both, when they file any "paper" in federal court that is
frivolous. 50 It is unclear whether any attorneys have been sanctioned
under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous amicus brief.51 Further, it is like-
wise unclear whether the clients of amicus filers would even be con-
sidered "parties" within the meaning of the rules. Federal courts pos-
sess inherent authority to sanction amicus parties, but it is unclear
that courts have ever sanctioned amicus parties using Rule 11.52
45. Julie Gannon Shoop, Too Many :Friends. Appeals Judge Urges Limits on Amicus
Briefs, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 18; Tony Mauro, Plenty of Friendly Advice, LEGAL TIMES, July
23, 1990, at S25.
46. 11TH CIR. R. 35-8; FED. CIR. R. 29.
47. Marcia Coyle, Amicus Disclosure Worries Some Amici, NAT'L L. J. 1, Apr. 1996, at
A14.
48. See, e.g., 9th CIR. R. 26.1 available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.
nsf/FRAP+and+Circuit+Rules?OpenView (requiring a corporate disclosure statement of
parent corporations which are publicly held so that judges may evaluate their stock owner-
ship).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
51. A search of Westlaw and Lexis databases returned no results.
52. See A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United States, 948 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[A
statue imposing sanctions] speaks to the 'excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees rea-
sonably incurred ...,' [and] ordinarily the statute is referring to burdens a party imposes
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Because of the broad guidelines for acceptance of amicus briefs,
there seem to be few examples of federal judges rejecting the filing of
amicus briefs. Often, the rejection of amicus briefs appears in state
court cases and seems more related to the gamesmanship of the per-
sons filing the amicus brief than the content of the brief itself. For
example, in Thalheim v. Town of Greenwich,53 an attorney filed a
writ of error in the Supreme Court of Connecticut upon being sanc-
tioned by a Connecticut appellate court for violating local rules of
practice by filing an amicus brief in a case without first obtaining
permission from court or filing an appearance in the case. Although
not a party to the case, the attorney filed a direct appeal to a lower
court decision.54
In Thalheim, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the
amicus rules, arguing that they infringed on his First Amendment
right to " 'petition the government for redress of grievances.' -"9 The
court disagreed because the rules of practice did not prohibit the fil-
ing of an amicus brief, but instead required him to first obtain per-
mission from court, and thus did not implicate the "right to petition
the government" clause of the First Amendment. 56 In its holding, the
court did not discuss the general implications of the First Amend-
ment on amicus brief filings. The court noted that Appellant did not
raise a claim under the "free speech" clause.5 1
The Thalheim case is a limited test of the constitutional claims of
this Article, to be discussed in Part III. The Thalheim case, however,
is of limited usefulness to the question of whether the right to file an
amicus is granted by the petition clause of the First Amendment.
First, as a state supreme court case, it has limited influence on the
federal courts, where this issue will most often be raised. Second, the
case may have been marked more by the gamesmanship of the attor-
ney than a definitive ruling on the constitutional arguments about
amicus briefs. Third, the court did not discuss the free speech impli-
cations of filing amicus briefs. Although other courts have followed
Thalheim, the constitutional status of amicus briefs is an open ques-
tion. 58
on the opposing party. Here, [petitioner] is not a party but an amicus."). A search of FRCP
11 cases in the Westlaw database revealed no instances of sanctions being imposed on fil-
ers of amicus briefs.
53. 775 A.2d 947 (Conn. 2001).
54. Id. at 954.
55. Id. at 956.
56. Id. at 957.
57. Id.
58. See State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 611-13 (Conn. 2005); Witty v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n of Hartland, 66 Conn. App. 387, 396 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (amicus brief cannot be
partisan); see also Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2005) (order of the
Illinois Supreme Court denying leave to file an amicus brief by the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce). The Illinois Supreme Court has recently promulgated a rule that an amicus filer
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B. Diverging Views of Amicus Briefs in the Courts of Appeals
Although courts do not often reject amicus briefs, one particularly
influential appellate judge, Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit,
has expressed skepticism about the value of some amicus briefs. 59 Al-
though these cases are somewhat isolated, Judge Posner's status as a
prominent judge and intellectual means that his decisions rejecting
amicus briefs may encourage other judges to reject amicus briefs.60
Thus, a closer examination of these cases is warranted.
In Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Judge Pos-
ner, sitting alone, denied the Chicago Board of Trade leave to file an
amicus brief in a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Commission
in the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner refused to accept the brief, stat-
ing that "[a]fter 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast ma-
jority of which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it
would be good to scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a
fish-eyed, fashion."16 1 Judge Posner elaborated on the standard he
would use in the future:
An amicus brief should normally be allowed when a party is not
represented competently or is not represented at all, when the
amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by
the decision in the present case (though not enough affected to en-
title the amicus to intervene and become a party in the present
case), or when the amicus has unique information or perspective
that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the
parties are able to provide.6 2
that fills its legal brief with legal arguments duplicative of those made by the parties may
be sanctioned and ordered to pay the reasonable costs of the other parties. ILL. S. CT. R.
345, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourtRules/ArtIII/ArtIII.htm#345;
see Ex Ante, Inamicable, 9 GREEN BAG 104 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois' revised Rule 345).
59. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n, 125 F,3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
60. See Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 83 (D. N.J.
1993) (rejecting amicus brief); Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D. N.J. 1985) (al-
lowing amicus brief); cf. Sierra Club, Inc. v. E.P.A., 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004) (deny-
ing intervention and opining that the party seeking to intervene does not even justify
amicus status: "Courts value submissions not to see how the interest groups line up, but to
learn about facts and legal perspectives that the litigants have not adequately developed.');
Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (lith. Cir. 2003) (time spent preparing amicus briefs
was not compensable); see also Martha Minow, Religion and the Burden of Proof Posner's
Economics and Pragmatism in Metzl v. Leininger, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1175, 1185-86 (2007);
Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Private Choices and Public Law: Richard A. Pos-
ner's Contributions to Family Law and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 403, 404-
05 (2001); David Cole, The Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After
9/11, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1735 (2007) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:
THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006)).
61. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063.
62. Id.
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Any amicus brief not meeting the above criteria, Judge Posner con-
cluded, should be denied.6 3
In 2000, Judge Posner was part of a panel of three judges that de-
nied leave to file an amicus brief in National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler,6 a case with a long litigation history that in-
cluded several trips to the Supreme Court 6 5 The case involved abor-
tion clinic protests and whether the Hobbs Act, which prevents rob-
bery or extortion, would support an injunction against the protests.6
The court denied the amicus briefs of Priests for Life, Life Legal De-
fense Foundation, and the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence in support of antiabortion activists.6 7 The court reiterated the
three conditions for the acceptance of amicus brief discussed above in
Ryan.68 The court justified these standards on three grounds, gener-
ally that (1) it would be irresponsible to accept a brief "and then not
read it (or at least glance at it, or require our law clerks to read it)";
(2) amicus briefs are often an attempt by parties to evade a court's
page limitations; and (3) "[a]micus curiae briefs are often attempts to
inject interest-group politics into the federal appellate process by
flaunting the interest of a trade association or other interest group in
the outcome of the appeal. '69 The court denied the motion of the three
putative amicus parties, though amicus briefs from other filers were
allowed by the court in the subsequent appeal on the merits.70
Three years later, in 2003, Judge Posner denied a motion for leave
to file an amicus brief in Voices for Choices, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co.7 The briefs in that case were presented by state officials
and a labor union on the grounds that the parties in the case, a con-
sumer group and a large telephone utility company, did not represent
all viewpoints. 72 Judge Posner, sitting alone, rejected the briefs on
the following grounds: (1) the existing parties were adequately repre-
sented; (2) the amici had no direct interest in another case that may
be materially affected by decision in this one; (3) the amici had no
distinct perspective or additional information; and (4) the viewpoint
of state officials was no different than that of party Southwestern
63. Id.
64. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000).
65. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org.
for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
(1994).
66. Scheidler, 547 U.S. at 13-14.
67. Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 616-17.
68. Id. at 617.
69. Id. at 616-17.
70. See, e.g., Brief for James Serritella et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Nat'l Org. For Women v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-3336, 99-3892,
99-3891, 99-3076-01-2050).
71. 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 543-44.
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Bell Corporation.7 3 Judge Posner acknowledged that under court
rules the State of Illinois could file a brief without leave of court, but
the legislators were not purporting to speak on behalf of the state.4
"Essentially, the proposed amicus briefs merely announce the 'vote'
of the amici on the decision of the appeal. But, as I have been at
pains to emphasize in contrasting the legislative and judicial proc-
esses, they have no vote," wrote Judge Posner.7 5
In a related context, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the attorney's fees that a successful party sought for the time spent
reading and responding to amicus briefs. In Glassroth v. Moore, the
court was concerned that compensating for work done in connection
with supporting amicus briefs would only encourage more amicus
briefs, which the court was "loathe to do."'76 The court stated, however
that a reasonable amount of time spent reading and responding to
opposing amicus briefs would continue to be compensable.77
Although Judge Posner is an influential jurist and academic, not
all appellate judges have followed his decisions on amicus briefs. In
an opinion on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals before his appoint-
ment to the United States Supreme Court, Judge Samuel Alito con-
sidered Judge Posner's amicus decisions in Neonatology Associates,
P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.7 Neonatology Associates
was an appeal from a tax court decision where five physicians sought
leave to file an amicus brief in support of the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue. 79 The taxpayer appellants, two professional medical
corporations, were defending against a government prosecution for
erroneous deductions and back taxes. The taxpayers argued that the
court should not accept the brief because the doctors were not "im-
partial," and did not have a "pecuniary interest" in the outcome.8 0
The doctors argued that their amicus brief should be filed because
they wanted to preserve certain factual findings to connect the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to findings in the tax court below.
They also wanted to question the application of the Employee Re-
tirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) to the case.8 1 The doctors
73. Id. at 545-46.
74. Id. at 545.
75. Id.
76. Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th. Cir. 2003) ("[Almicus briefs are often
used as a means of evading the page limitations on a party's briefs." (citing Voices for
Choices, 339 F.3d at 544)).
77. Id.
78. 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 130.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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thus did not seem very interested in whether or not the medical cor-
porations had taken proper deductions. 82
Judge Alito considered Judge Posner's line of decisions regarding
amicus filings and ultimately allowed the amicus brief to be filed. As
to impartiality, Judge Alito decided that this conception of the
amicus curiae became "outdated long ago. '83 Judge Alito wrote that
the idea that a friend of the court cannot also be a friend of the party
is "contrary to the fundamental assumption of our adversary system
that strong (but fair) advocacy on behalf of opposing views promotes
sound decision making.'
In Neonatology Associates, Judge Alito considered an earlier Third
Circuit case that seemed to limit the ability of parties to file amicus
briefs. In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh, a case that ultimately went to the Supreme Court re-
garding the constitutionality of abortion restrictions, the Third Cir-
cuit denied the motion of a group of law professors to file an amicus
brief because the professors did not "represent any individual or or-
ganization with a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at
issue ... only their concern about the manner in which this court will
interpret the law .... -85 Judge Alito did not decide whether the
American College court accurately interpreted the "interest" re-
quirement, but he felt that doctors in the case had adequately
showed an interest in the outcome and allowed their brief.8 6
Judge Alito's decision to allow the amicus brief in Neonatology As-
sociates may or may not be a bellwether for how he will treat amicus
briefs as a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. His opinion shows the
difficulties judges face in determining the degree of interest a party
filing an amicus brief has, and whether some parties have too great a
vested interest in the outcome of the matter. While the court deci-
sions denying leave to file amicus briefs are a small sample of the
large number of amicus briefs that are accepted for filing, they repre-
sent a trend that might make it more difficult to file amicus briefs.
Despite the split between the circuits, a number of district court
judges have followed Judge Posner's reasoning. 7 Perhaps as a reac-
tion to an increasing number of amicus briefs in high profile cases,
82. Id.
83. Id. at 131.
84. Id.
85. 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983); see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (ruling on the constitutionality of various provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act).
86. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133.
87. Hughes v. White, 388 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Dow Chem. Co. v.
U.S., No. 00-CV -10331-BC, 2002 WL 33012185, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2002).
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some trial court judges have sought demanding showings of why a
particular amicus brief would add to the arguments of the parties.88
C. Recent Controversies Involving Amicus Participation
Recent briefs filed by law professors, retired judges, and members
of Congress have sparked controversy and may lead to judicial sen-
timent against amicus status and more frequent denials of amicus
briefs. 9 In some cases, legislators have filed amicus briefs to draw at-
tention to certain parts of legislative history to influence the courts'
interpretation of legislation. When the Supreme Court was consider-
ing a major case involving court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
claims, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Senators John Kyl and Lindsey Gra-
ham filed an amicus brief to argue that Congress intended to strip
the courts of jurisdiction. 9° Some argued that the senators misled the
court in coloring the legislative history to deprive the court of juris-
diction.9 1
In another case related to the U.S. detention facility at Guan-
tanamo, a group of former judges sought leave to file an amicus brief
in support of greater due process for the detainees.9 2 The court denied
leave to file the brief because the former judges identified themselves
as judges.93 The court's brief order, joined by Judge Sentelle and
Judge Randolph, cited an advisory opinion of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, that states: "Judges should insure that the title
88. Abu-Jamal v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 99-5089, 2000 WL 1100784, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
7, 2000) (amicus rejected in high profile case in part to avoid the potential onslaught of
more amicus filings).
89. The recent criminal prosecution and sentencing of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby in-
volved an amicus brief. A group of law professors filed a nine page motion for leave to file
an amicus brief in support of Libby. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and
Brief of Law Professors Vikram Amar et al., United States v. Libby, 495 F.Supp.2d 49
(D.D.C. 2007) (No 05-394). In handing down Mr. Libby's sentence, Judge Reggie Walton
stated that the professors' brief had little value in his decision: 'With all due respect, these
are intelligent people, but I would not accept this brief from a first year law student. I be-
lieve this was put out to put pressure on this court in the public sphere to rule as you
wish." John W. Dean, Scooter Libby's Appeal: The Focus Shifts to the Highly Political U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, FINDLAW'S WRIT, June 15, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20070615.html.
90. Brief for Sen. Graham and Sen. Kyl as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (holding that the military com-
missions for detainees at Guantanamo Bay violate the Constitution); see also David L.
Hudson, Detainees Have Some Powerful Friends, 2 No. 45 A.B.A. J. E-Rep. 1, Nov. 14,
2003.
91. Emily Bazelon, Invisible Men, SLATE, Mar. 27, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2138750; John W. Dean, Senators Kyl and Graham's Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld Scam: The Deceptive Amicus Brief They Filed in the Guantanamo Detainee Case,
FINDLAW'S WRIT, July 5, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060705.html.
92. Adam Liptak, Appeals Court Rejects Brief Submitted by Ex-Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2006, at A15.
93. Id.
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'judge' is not used in the courtroom or in papers involved in litigation
before them to designate a former judge, unless the designation is
necessary to describe accurately a person's status at a time pertinent
to the lawsuit."94 In dissent from the court's order, Judge Rogers
stated that even if the former federal judges had used their judicial
titles, this was not a reason to reject the brief.95
These recent cases illustrate that nonparties are increasingly us-
ing amicus briefs to participate in the courts in ways similar to other
democratic forums. As with all facets of the democratic process, there
is potential for abuse by citizens, and, in some cases, legislators.
Such abuses may make judges less willing to accept amicus briefs.
These incidents also raise important questions about the role of
judges and legislators in a democratic system, which I will address
below.
D. Amicus Participation as Interest Group Activity
One of the most frequent objections to amicus briefs is that they
are a nefarious form of interest group activity.96 With the rising in-
fluence of moneyed interests in politics, there is growing concern
about governmental decisions being made under the sway of these
interests. 97 Special interest influence exists in the courts because
those who have sufficient resources can engage in extensive litiga-
tion.98 Interest groups have utilized the current amicus rules to file
an increasingly larger number of briefs. Although amicus briefs do
not require vast resources, groups with greater resources are more
likely to file them.99 If well-heeled interest groups file amicus briefs
unimpeded, the arguments of groups with lesser resources might be
lost.
94. Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 72 (Feb. 2,
1982), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/72.html.
95. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
96. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. No. 4 1109, 1111 (1988); Fowler V. Harper
& Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1953);
Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas: Amicus Curiae Briefs May Be More Popular than
Persuasive, 82 A.B.A. J. 46, 46-48 (1996).
97. See, e.g., JOHN R. McARTHUR, THE SELLING OF FREE TRADE: NAFTA,
WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOcRACY (2000) (describing how
powerful interests lobbied for the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement).
98. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 787 n.146 (2000) (discussing how resources
reflect the extent of amicus participation).
99. See generally Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae
Participation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 LAW & POLY 161 (1987) (illus-
trating the impact of two organizations with resources).
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There are immediate difficulties with characterizing amicus activ-
ity as "interest group politics." First, interest group politics are at the
heart of a representative democracy. 100 Second, amicus participation
can serve to level the playing field by providing a relatively low cost
option for groups to band together and influence governmental pol-
icy. Third, because the Solicitor General can often file briefs on be-
half of the government, the ability of nongovernmental groups to
have broad access to the courts adds to the voices heard in the deci-
sionmaking process. Finally, while amicus participation raises con-
cerns relating to the imbalance of resources that may skew amicus
participation toward the wealthy, these concerns are no different
than in any other area of litigation, and should be a reason for
greater access to justice resources, rather than limiting amicus fil-
ings. 101
Judge Posner's concerns about the infiltration of interest group
politics in the litigation process coincides with his views supporting
Schumpeterian democracy, which idealizes democracy as a clash be-
tween organized interests.1 0 2 Joseph Schumpeter was an early twen-
tieth century Austrian economist, positing that those with ample
wealth have access to the democratic process. 0 3 In Posner's book
Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, he describes deliberative democ-
racy as a competing philosophy to his own Schumpeterian philoso-
phy.1 0 4 Of course, Judge Posner's theory is primarily intended for leg-
islative politics; a preference for Schumpeterian politics need not dic-
tate the judicial process.
The pragmatist view that Judge Posner espouses as the preferred
mode of adjudication works better with a more open attitude toward
amicus briefs. Pragmatic solutions will most likely come from a
greater number of voices in the decisionmaking process. Economic
theory, which favors the role of information, also supports greater ac-
cess for amicus filers to the courts than Judge Posner seems to allow.
Often, amicus parties can provide needed information to judges, as in
scientific and technical areas. 0 5 For example, in a recent antitrust
100. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMocRAcY: AUTONOMY VS.
CONTROL 1 (1982) (noting that independent organizations are highly desirable in a democ-
racy, even though they also present the opportunity to do harm).
101. But see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCY REV. 95 (1974) (showing the value of repeat player
status); Donald Songer et al., Why the Haves Don't Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat Play-
ers Meet Amici Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 POL. RES. Q. 537 (2000).
102. POSNER, supra note 23, at 14.
103. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOcIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (4th ed.
1976); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. ECON. 875 (1975).
104. POSNER, supra note 23, at 192-93.
105. James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role ofInforma-
tion at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365, 366 (1997).
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case in the U.S. Supreme Court, a group of economists filed an
amicus brief supporting a rule that would not hold retail minimum
pricing agreements per se illegal in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.10 6 In the opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy
cited the economists' view as a reason for the overruling of a ninety-
year-old antitrust precedent: "Respected economic analysts . . . con-
clude that vertical price restraints can have precompetitive ef-
fects. 1 0 7 In this case, the views of amici seemed to have more weight
than the principle of stare decisis.
The antitrust case discussed above suggests that powerful inter-
ests can use amicus briefs to influence court decisions. 0 8 The concern
about wealthy, powerful interests having a louder voice may be as-
suaged by the ability of smaller groups to form coalitions and have
their voices heard. This is not much different, however, than the
ways that small nonprofits form coalitions to pass legislation. In fact,
an amicus standard that makes it easier to file briefs may serve to
narrow existing power imbalances between powerful interests in so-
ciety that regularly litigate and those that are only able to file
amicus briefs.
Even with an increase in the number of amicus briefs filed by in-
terest groups, there are democratic reasons why we should not be
concerned about the increased filings of amicus briefs. In fact, as I
will argue below, amicus participation is integral to a democratic
court system.
III. SITUATING AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSTITUTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech... or the right ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."' 0 9 Litigation has been used for expression throughout
history, and as a form of petition for the redress of grievances. This
Part applies these principles to amicus participation on the theory
that the First Amendment is considered one of the legal underpin-
nings of a democratic society. At the same time, the First Amend-
ment's tension with egalitarian principles has been debated by schol-
106. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); see also Brief for Economists as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No.
06-480), 2007 WL 173681.
107. 127 S. Ct. at 2710, 2714-15 (citing the Brief of Amici Curiae Economists).
108. Numerous interests filed amicus briefs in Leegin, including the American Petro-
leum Institute. See Brief for Am. Petroleum Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No 06-480), 2007 WL 160781.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ars.110 Nevertheless, if we are to evaluate the democratic need for
amicus participation, the principles underlying the First Amendment
should be examined.
A. Freedom of Speech
Amicus briefs, like all briefs, are a form of speech."' There are
limits, however, to free speech in the litigation context.1 12 Courts
have inherent authority to sanction lawyers who violate ethical rules
or engage in fraudulent speech."3 Litigation is rarely analyzed in the
same ways as other types of speech, where close attention is paid to
the type of speech and the location in which the speech takes place." 4
For example, political speech generally has stronger protection than
other types of speech, such as commercial speech." 5 While one can
make a political speech quite freely on a public sidewalk, one cannot
make the same speech from the audience in a courtroom, or the gal-
lery of a legislature, without being removed from the chambers.
The categorical approach to whether speech is protected by the
First Amendment begins by identifying the place in which speech oc-
curs. 1 6 This is called forum analysis. Speech that occurs in some lo-
cations-such as the town square or the public sidewalk-that have
been used for speech since time immemorial have been afforded the
strong protection of the traditional public forum." 7 In a designated
public forum, by contrast, the government may impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on the speech, provided there
110. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzis?: HATE
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993).
111. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 705, 791 (2004) ("Litigants have the free speech right to participate in ... decisions
that will bind them.").
112. Id. ('[T]he value of participation necessitates both freedom of speech and con-
straints on that freedom.").
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
114. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discuss-
ing how in traditional and designated public forums, the government may regulate the
time, place, and manner of speech as long as the restrictions are "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication").
115. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
116. Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute prohibiting the car-
rying of any "public notice" in front of the U.S. Supreme Court was deemed unconstitu-
tional) with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (statute prohibiting picketing "near
courthouse" was constitutional).
117. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
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are other avenues for communication. 118 It is difficult to place litiga-
tion generally and amicus participation specifically into a forum
analysis. For one thing, courts are multilayered forums for speech.
Witnesses are controlled in what they can say by the rules of evi-
dence and perjury cases, but otherwise they have wide berth to say
whatever they want, whether it helps them or hurts them. Lawyers
are even more controlled in the presentation of evidence, but they
also have significant control over their opening and closing state-
ments." 9 In briefs, outside of sanctions for clearly frivolous behavior,
there are wide areas of legitimate advocacy in which lawyers are free
to speak. 20
As discussed above, treating litigation as a public forum is highly
dependent on the context in which the speech takes place.' 2 ' Identify-
ing a public forum as traditional, such as sidewalks, parks, and areas
that have been treated as open for time immemorial, gives the speech
a high form of protection. 22 The characterization of a place as a non-
public forum will lead to lesser speech protection, whether it is politi-
cal or nonpolitical speech. 23 Even in a traditional or designated pub-
lic forum, there can be time, place, and manner restrictions as long
as there are reasonably adequate alternatives for the speech.
The foregoing shows that First Amendment forum analysis does
not apply well to the filing of briefs. Indeed, recent decisions of the
Supreme Court suggest that litigation may be a separate category of
speech deserving of special analysis. 124 There is only one forum in
which litigation takes place: the courts. Whether or not classified as
a traditional, limited purpose or nonpublic, forum analysis makes lit-
tle sense in the context of litigation.
While the litigants may argue that there are no equally adequate
alternatives to court filings to get their message to the judges in a
court, the fact is that placing such arguments in the media and other
avenues may be an equally good way to get their messages out. At
the same time, the time, place, and manner regulations that are now
utilized may fail the "reasonableness" test if they are vague enough
to prevent litigants from knowing exactly which speech is being pro-
118. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998).
119. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BAT"rLES AND THE LONG
ROAD To JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003).
120. See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477 (2004).
121. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
122. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
123. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that a federal military reserva-
tion was not a public forum, and regulations relating to distributing leaflets and speeches
were not unconstitutional).
124. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-49 (2001).
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scribed.125 For these and other reasons that I will describe below, the
right to file in court is more often premised on the First Amendment
Right to Petition.
B. The Right to Petition
The First Amendment prohibits government interference with
"the right of the people.., to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.' 1 26 The United States Supreme Court recently held in BE
& K Construction Co. v. NLRB that the right to petition protects
even ill-motivated lawsuits as long as they are reasonably based in
fact or law. 127 Thus, the right to file a lawsuit is constitutionally pro-
tected. 128 Indeed, one commentator has called the right to petition"nearly absolute.' ' 29 Despite the breadth of the Petition Clause, the
question of whether the filing of an amicus brief is protected by the
Petition Clause has yet to be decided by a federal court.
A textual reading of the First Amendment suggests a narrow view
of what the Petition Clause protects. The text of the First Amend-
ment presupposes protection for a grievance to be redressed. 30 Like
the concept of standing under Article III of the Constitution, the
scope of the Petition clause would be narrowly constricted if it only
applied to petitions for relief from a redressable harm. Unless a law-
suit has been filed, the filing of a brief would not likely be protected.
By analogy, this narrow reading would exclude much of the petition
activity, such as testifying before legislative bodies and at adminis-
125. Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First
Amendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605 (1999) (analyzing the role of amici in
two First Amendment cases).
126. U.S. CONST. amend I. (emphasis added) (incorporated to apply to the states in Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)).
127. BE & K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see generally Frederick Schauer,
Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998)
(evaluating how lawsuits are constitutionally protected though the courts have made insti-
tutional distinctions).
128. See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) (arguing that the
right exists to petition the court but as it currently extends only to winning claims, it
should be expanded); Gregory A- Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Sig-
nificance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (arguing that the right
to petition has been historically significant, though it has recently collapsed into other
First Amendment rights); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 899 (1997) (arguing for a very liberal interpretation of the petition clause).
129. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging..." An Analysis of the Ne-
glected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1986).
130. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (1999) ('Put simply, the constitutional right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances is precisely-for want of a better phrase-the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.").
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trative hearings, where the threshold for participation is a bare in-
terest in the outcome.13'
The problem with this narrow view of the Petition Clause is that
it excludes a large amount of activity that has historically been con-
sidered part of the Petition Clause. 3 2 A broader, citizen participation
view of the Petition Clause, which is advanced in this Article, would
encompass the filing of amicus briefs, based on whether the party fil-
ing the brief had merely an interest in the outcome, a standard that
is synonymous with the threshold for amicus briefs in the federal
courts of appeal. 3 3 The right to petition may be, and should be, pro-
tected by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.3 4
It is not clear that the standing requirement of Article III should
be applied to amicus filers since they are not parties to which the"case or controversy" requirement of Article III was meant to ap-
ply. 35 If the parties to the original litigation have standing, it would
be odd to prevent amicus parties from weighing in on a live case or
controversy. Indeed, even the most restrictive decisions on amicus
briefs allow amicus filings as long as the amicus filer has "an interest
in the outcome;" the only problem is that select judges tend to con-
strue that interest very narrowly. 3 6
Because lawsuits are protected by the First Amendment and are
subject to a great degree of court control, the question of whether
amicus briefs are constitutionally protected does not answer how the
courts should regulate them. Nevertheless, amicus participation has
many of the same constitutional implications as litigation, most
clearly seen in cases involving the meaning of constitutional provi-
sions. In many cases, amicus participation is used not only as a way
of making views known to the tribunal hearing the case, but also as a
way of making views known to the group's constituents and to the
general public. In this way, amicus participation serves an expres-
sive function in a democratic system. While there remain many ways
131. For an analysis of the protection afforded "public comment," see, for example, Pis-
cottano v. Town of Somers, 396 F. Supp. 2d 187, 206 (D. Conn. 2005), where a citizen al-
leged the town of Somers violated her right to speak at a board of selectmen meeting when
it did not allow her to speak regarding a town employee.
132. See Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83
(1981) (examining the increase in amici filings regarding the establishment clause after
World War II); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda An Empirical
Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 727 (2001) (evaluating how the Court agenda determines certio-
rari and its effects); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 667 (2003) (describing the history of the Petition Clause).
133. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. See Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-
Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 524 (2005) (allowing aggrieved nonparties to appeal
would "enhance the coherence of our law").
135. U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2, cl. 1.
136. See, e.g., the decisions of Judge Posner, discussed supra Part II; supra note 59.
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to express one's views, filing an amicus brief is an important way to
show an organization's commitment to an issue. In sum, amicus par-
ticipation is often about more than simply communicating to the
court; it is often part of a campaign about important political and so-
cial issues.
IV. AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DEMOCRATIC
SYSTEM
Besides the constitutional implications of restrictive rules for
amicus activity discussed above, amicus participation plays an im-
portant role in a democratic court system. Amicus briefs open a dia-
logue between the people and the legislative branches. Additionally,
amicus briefs are a way for citizens to provide input into questions of
constitutional law. Finally, there is a deliberative purpose to amicus
participation. In this Part, I will discuss several ways in which
amicus participation enhances the functioning of the American de-
mocratic system.
A. The "Notice and Comment" Function of Amicus Participation
In statutory cases dealing with the work of executive branch
agencies, amicus briefs can serve as an opportunity for interested
parties to provide comment on administrative rulemaking. Often,
these cases are litigated by the agency on behalf of the person who
was actually victimized by the violation of law. These cases often
deal with statutes that have been passed subject to the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, where in-
terested parties testify before administrative agencies on the impact
of proposed rulemaking. 13 7 Amicus participation can perform a simi-
lar function in cases interpreting statutes.3 8
Labor and employment law cases in particular raise the issue of
administrative agencies representing the interests of individuals who
are the victims of statutory violations. 139 The United States Supreme
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
138. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623 (2006) (arguing about the impor-
tance of the notice and comment process to the development of environmental law); David
S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Ex-
perience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1169.
139. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in
LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 423-24 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (telling
the story of the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)); Robert B. Moberly, The Story of Electromation: Are Employee
Participation Programs a Competitive Necessity of a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, in LABOR
LAW STORIES 315, 334-35 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (discussing
amicus participation by labor law professor Charles Morris in a case involving the "coin-
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Court case Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB provides an
excellent example of the need for amicus participation. 140 In Hoffman,
the evidence showed that a plastics company fired an undocumented
worker in retaliation for his union organizing activities.14 ' As a result
of the firing, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) brought an
unfair labor practice charge against the employer and sought full
back pay for the worker.142 Back pay is the amount that would have
been earned from the time of the unlawful firing to the present. In
Hoffman, the question before the Supreme Court centered on
whether an undocumented worker was entitled to the same remedies
as citizen workers. 4 3
The NLRB argued that back pay should be awarded because such
a remedy would serve as a deterrent for similarly situated employ-
ers.144 Many groups weighed in on all sides of the issue, including
immigrant rights groups and employer groups. 45 The amicus briefs
argued about the effects of limiting the available remedies for un-
documented immigrants who were fired in violation of labor law. 46
The Supreme Court held that back pay could not be awarded to the
undocumented worker because such a remedy would "trench upon
pany union" provision of the NLRA); Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of
Professional and Supervisory Status - Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle? in LABOR LAW
STORIES 353, 381-82 (discussing amicus participation in support of the NLRB's decision
finding charge nurses at a health care facility to be employees).
140. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
141. Id. at 140.
142. Id. at 140-41.
143. Id. at 140-42.
144. See Recording and Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137, available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001-00_1595/argument/ (Paul Wolfson, ar-
guing on behalf of the NLRB, stated: "Congress without question recognized when it
enacted IRCA that this was a many-faceted problem, and one aspect of the problem was
that there was a natural magnet in drawing illegal, undocumented workers here in the
wage differential, and that employers were willing to give jobs, and that it should not be
cheaper for an employer to hire an undocumented alien than it is to hire [an authorized
worker]."). The Supreme Court rejected the deterrence argument: "We have deemed such
'traditional remedies' sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether
the 'spur and catalyst' of backpay accompanies them." Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152 (citing
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)); see also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.
13, (CThis threat of contempt sanctions thereby provides a significant deterrent against fu-
ture violations of the [NLRA]."); Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 237 F.3d
639, 642 (arguing that not allowing backpay would encourage violations of the labor code).
145. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. & Make the Road By Walk-
ing, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595),
2001 WL 1631648; Brief for Am. Fed'n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amicus Cu-
riae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631720;
Brief for Employers and Employer Orgs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoff-
man, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631729; Brief for States of New York et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL
1636790.
146. See sources cited supra note 145.
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explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration pol-
icy." 47
Although the Supreme Court did not decide in favor of the social
movement groups that weighed in on behalf of the worker in Hoff-
man, the presence of the voices of social movement organizations
were important parts of the dialogue in a case that was more about
broad questions of immigration control than it was about back pay. 148
Moreover, since the statute being interpreted by the Court was more
than seventy years old, the need for a continuing dialogue was even
more important. Given the fact that interest group activity in litiga-
tion is inevitable and frequently desirable, there is reason to think
that it is both unreasonable and undesirable to demand that judicial
decisions be unaffected by the views of interested groups.
The "notice and comment" view echoes the tradition of legal real-
ism, which suggests that legal decisions are affected by the times in
which they are rendered. Legal realists believed that there was little
difference between the advocacy needed to change the law in the leg-
islature and in the courts. 149 In the tradition of early legal realist
Louis Brandeis, they often filed "Brandeis briefs" with the courts
that were filled with policy arguments and social science evidence to
sway the views of the judges. 150 Amicus briefs can serve an important
function in bringing social science evidence to the attention of the
courts. There might be concerns about the improper use of social sci-
ence evidence, as discussed in Part V, but these concerns should be
dealt with through the new standard advocated later in this Article.
B. Social Movement Dialogues
Social movement groups have utilized amicus briefs for many
years. Amicus briefs have played an important role in communicat-
147. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 138.
148. Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Di-
chotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 737, 737-41
(2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 283, 333 (2006).
149. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 1.2 (1995).
150. The most famous example of this was Brandeis's brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, (1908). See DIANA KLEBANOW & FRANKLIN L. JONAS, PEOPLE'S LAWYERS:
CRUSADERS FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 70-71 (2003) (describing Brandeis's repre-
sentation of the state of Oregon in defending different limits on the working hours of men
and women). In Muller, Brandeis attempted in his brief to show the "real or substantial re-
lation to public health [and] welfare." The brief contained only a few pages of legal argu-
ment but more than a hundred pages of data drawn from experts testifying to the connec-
tion between safety and morals and the limitation of women's hours. For a critique of Mul-
ler from a feminist perspective, see, for example, Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to
Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986).
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ing the views of social movements to the courts in numerous cases.'5 '
The NAACP began its campaign against legal segregation by filing
amicus briefs in a 1950s case involving the Westminster School Dis-
trict in Orange County, California. 152 Plaintiffs in Westminster School
District of Orange County v. Mendez successfully challenged the seg-
regation of Mexican-American children.1 53 Thurgood Marshall and
Robert L. Carter, among other NAACP and ACLU lawyers, filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the children, arguing that the school dis-
trict's policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 4 The brief outlined some of the initial data that would
be used in Brown v. Board of Education.5
Social movement organizations use amicus briefs to communicate
to their constituencies and the general public. The Society of Ameri-
can Law Teachers, for example, has filed amicus briefs in several
high profile cases. 56 Sometimes, as in the case of the NAACP, or-
ganizations have used amicus briefs to test the water for broader vic-
tories, such as the Brown decision. Indeed, utilizing amicus briefs to
151. See, e.g., SUZANNE U. SAMUELS, FIRST AMONG FRIENDS: INTEREST GROUPS, THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (2004) (examining the influence of inter-
est groups as amici); Caroline Bettinger-Lopez & Susan P. Sturm, International Union,
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls: The History of Litigation Alliances and Mobilizations to Chal-
lenge Fetal Protection Policies, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 12-14 (Myriam Gilles & Risa
Goluboff eds., 2007) (discussing how the litigation-centered movement against fetal protec-
tion policies was both effective and incomplete); Suzanne Uttaro Samuels, Amici Curiae
and the Supreme Court's Review of Fetal Protection Policies, 78 JUDICATURE 236 (1995)
(arguing that the diverse amicus participation surrounding U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls
contributed to the Court's decision); Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Repre-
sentation of U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae in Non-U.S. and Multi-National Courts as a Means
of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 110 (2004) (discussing the im-
portance of amicus briefs in bringing media attention to the case).
152. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 775 (9th
Cir. 1947).
There is argument in two of the amicus curiae briefs that we should
strike out independently on the whole question of segregation, on the
ground that recent world stirring events have set men to the reexami-
nation of concepts considered fixed . . . For reasons presently to be
stated, we are of the opinion that the segregation cases do not rule the
instant case and that is reason enough for not responding to the argu-
ment that we should consider them in light of the amicus curiae briefs.
Id. at 780.
153. Id. at 781.
154. Motion and Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People as
Amicus Curiae at 16, Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 161 F.2d 774, (No. 11310)
(on file at the Los Angeles County Law Library); see also Gilbert Gonzalez, Richard Klu-
ger's Simple Justice: Race, Class, and United States Imperialism, 44 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 140,
142 (2004).
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
156. See Society of American Law Teachers: Amicus Briefs,
http://www.saltlaw.orgflibrary (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
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test theories may be less ethically freighted than filing lawsuits to
check the receptiveness of the courts to various theories. 157
C. Amicus Participation as a Professional Duty
Amicus advocacy is an important aspect of the role that lawyers
play in a democratic society.1 5 8 This is another reason why amicus
participation should not be unreasonably blocked by the courts. A
lawsuit may not always be the most effective way to represent a par-
ticular client. In some cases, attorneys may fulfill their duty of dili-
gence and competence by filing an amicus brief. Often, a client may
have an interest in litigation that is not being adequately repre-
sented by the parties in a lawsuit, but they may not have the ability
to join the lawsuit.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow persons or groups to
join ongoing litigation as interveners. FRCP 24 requires the court to
grant intervention in certain limited circumstances, such as when a
statute grants a right to intervene, or when property or a transaction
is at issue and the existing parties to a lawsuit cannot adequately
protect the interest.5 9 Rule 24(b) allows the court to grant interven-
tion (1) if a statute grants a conditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the person seeking to intervene can point to common questions
of law and fact in the ongoing litigation.160 Although intervention
may be available for many amicus filers, there are a number of rea-
sons why amicus filers would rather not invest the time and expense
in being a party and would rather have their voice heard through
amicus filing. Often, the court will allow a party who is unable to in-
tervene to participate in a case as an "amicus 'plus,'" with a greater
role than simply filing a single brief.1 6 Thus, the amicus brief may
provide a valuable way for clients to make their arguments known to
the court in a cost effective way. For that reason, amicus participa-
157. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-
1920), in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 114
(Susan D. Carle ed., 2005) (discussing the test case strategy of the NAACP within the con-
text of legal ethics concepts).
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preamble 6 (2003).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1), (2). Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the dis-
position of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties. Id.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Rule allows the court to refuse intervention if the inter-
vention would "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original par-
ties." Id.
161. Liberty Res. Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209-10 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (denying intervention but allowing "amicus plus" status, including the right to ar-
gue-with leave of the court-at court hearings).
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tion may play an important role in lawyers' fulfillment of their ethi-
cal duties.
One of the criticisms of amicus briefs is that parties might mis-
represent facts and evidence to support their position. This would be
a violation of the ethical rules, but it is no more a danger with
amicus briefs than any other briefs. Even though judges retain the
authority to sanction attorneys for unlawful filings, it appears that
judges rarely sanction attorneys for violations in amicus briefs. 162 In
any case, sanctions are always available for egregious conduct by at-
torneys who file amicus briefs.
Lawyers have duties of competence and diligence in representing
their clients. 163 The lawyer can fulfill these duties in a variety of
ways, including filing amicus briefs. When a client's interests might
be affected by litigation to which he is not a party, a lawyer may be
representing their clients most diligently and competently by filing
amicus briefs in relevant litigation. Thus, the rules should not un-
reasonably limit the lawyers' fulfillment of their ethical duties.
For lawyers to fulfill their roles as public citizens, sanctions
should not be imposed lightly. Judges should reserve sanctions for
only the most egregious actions. In this way, lawyers are better able
to fulfill their role in a democratic society that the American Bar As-
sociation calls for in its rules. 6 4 Lawyers would also be more willing
to file amicus briefs when necessary on behalf of their clients if they
did not fear discipline for their briefs.
D. Citizen Amicus Participation
Citizens may also use amicus briefs to let their voices be heard in
the courts, even if they are not represented by attorneys. Court rules
may also allow pro se litigants acting without attorneys to file
amicus briefs. In the recent California Supreme Court cases on the
San Francisco Mayor's authority to process gay marriages, briefs
were filed pro se by individual citizens attempting to influence the
court's decision. One of the amicus briefs opposing the Mayor's ac-
tions was filed by Divine Queen Mariette Do-Nguyen. 165 The sixteen-
page document, a collection of biblical verses and moralist philoso-
162. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.1-1.3.
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr preamble 6 ("[A] lawyer should further the
public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because
legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and sup-
port to maintain their authority.").
165. Brief for Divine Queen Mariette Do-Nguyen, as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Lockyer v. City & County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (2004) (Nos. S122923, S122865),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/briefs/DIVINAC.PDF.
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phy, was not cited at all in the court's final decision. 166 Even though
judges may not utilize pro se briefs in their decisions or delibera-
tions, those who file these briefs at least have a voice in the judicial
process.
The possibility of pro se litigants flooding the courts with frivolous
amicus briefs is a threat to the workability of my proposed standard,
but it should be remembered that Rule 11 sanctions would apply
equally to attorneys as to parties without attorneys. Indeed, it is not
clear that the current rule has kept many amicus briefs from being
filed. The risk of vexatious filings is balanced by the benefits of de-
mocratic participation in the court system.
Moreover, the right to appear without a lawyer is protected both
by the Constitution and by statutes. 167 The right to appear without a
lawyer dates to the Judiciary Act of 1789,168 where Congress provided
that in all federal courts, "the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel.' 1 69 In a May 2007 United States
Supreme Court decision involving the right of parents to represent
themselves in proceedings about the appropriateness of their dis-
abled children's education, the definition of a "party aggrieved" was
central to the court's interpretation that a federal statute conferred
that right.170 Justice Scalia, in a partial dissent, would have held that
the statute only gives "parties" the right to challenge the appropri-
ateness of the individual education plans, but defines a "party ag-
grieved" from Black's Law Dictionary as a person whose "personal,
pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by an-
other person's actions or by a court's decree or judgment."' 71 This
narrow conception of party status may limit the ability of pro se liti-
gants to file amicus briefs since their person or property may not be
directly affected by the court's outcome. While this limitation on
nonparties may make sense from the perspective of Article III stand-
ing, since Article III standing requires an injury redressable by the
court, it makes less sense for pro se amicus filing, or amicus filings
generally, as I have argued above. Indeed, courts should view the re-
166. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 495-97 (discussing arguments set forth by city and amici cu-
riae).
167. This is true except in the limited areas of corporations appearing without a law-
yer. Advanced Sys. Tech. Inc. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 355, 358 (Ct. Cl. 2006) (corpora-
tion cannot appear as amici without a lawyer). In BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S.
516, 519-20 (2002), Justice O'Connor wrote that the NLRB was really trying to deal with
sham litigation. The right to Petition, she said, is one of the "the most precious of liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights" and the right of access to the courts is one aspect of the
right to petition. Id. at 524.
168. 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000).
170. Winkeliman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2003 (2007).
171. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 1154 (8th ed.
2004)).
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quirement of an "interest in the outcome" in the litigation broadly, in
keeping with the normative commitments furthered in this Article.
E. Amici and Popular Constitutionalism
Increased use of amicus briefs might lend support to constitu-
tional scholars who argue that the constitutional law should better
reflect the will of the people. Dean Larry Kramer has been one of the
main proponents of this view. 172 The popular constitutionalist view
also has been espoused by other scholars such as Mark Tushnet and
Sanford Levinson. 7 3 While popular constitutionalism focuses specifi-
cally on the proper way of interpreting the Constitution, the theory
also envisions a broader involvement in the courts than is currently
practiced. 174 The idea is that the "people themselves" create constitu-
tional law, not the courts. While not going as far as popular constitu-
tionalism, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's concept of"active liberty" also envisions an active role for citizens in their gov-
ernment, which includes the courts and constitutional interpreta-
tion. 175
Popular constitutionalist theory focuses largely on the proper in-
stitutional arrangements for constitutional decisionmaking, but the
theory can also be applied to statutory interpretation cases as well. If
the interpretation of the constitution should ultimately rest with the
people, it is not a great leap that the people should also engage in
statutory creation, or, in Ethan Leib's words, a "popular branch" of
government.176
The difficulty of measuring public opinion and its relevance to de-
ciding constitutional law cases are only two of the problems inherent
in popular constitutionalist theories. The merits of popular constitu-
tionalism will continue to be debated. 77 That debate is not the point
of this Article, however. All of this merely shows that active partici-
pation in government, including the courts, is increasingly viewed as
essential to the functioning of a democratic system. That participa-
172. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
173. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 (1999)
(describing popular constitutionalism as a process of deciding what the Constitution
means).
174. Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52 (2004).
175. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
176. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A
POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 121-23 (2004) (arguing for interest group pluralism).
177. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 719, 719-21 (2006); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-
34 (2001).
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tion can take a variety of forms, including filing amicus briefs. Thus,
the standards for filing such amicus briefs should not be unreasona-
bly high.
F. Amicus Participation as Democratic Deliberation
Perhaps the best argument for liberal standards for the filing of
amicus briefs is the argument for making the courts a forum for dis-
cussion in a democratic system. As discussed above, amicus partici-
pation has provided needed cues and support to social movements
and has given social movements a stake in the rule of law. 178 Delib-
erative democracy presents a view of democracy that, in its purest
form, requires democratic decisions to be made by consensus. The
version of deliberative democracy that I am using here is simply the
idea that democratic decisionmaking is improved by a greater num-
ber of voices in the process. 179
Ethan Lieb has applied deliberative democracy concepts to the
initiative process.180 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have writ-
ten at length on this subject. 8 1 Judge Richard Posner has also ana-
lyzed and contrasted his approach-Schumpeterian-with delibera-
tive democracy. 182 Schumpeterian democracy views the democratic
process as largely a competition between elites for power.8 3 The
Schumpeterian view may be an accurate description of the reality of
the American political system, but this may not be the ideal. In my
view, a system with fewer barriers to entry is more democratic than
one controlled by elites.
One might ask whether the courts are the best place for democ-
ratic deliberation. Those who are skeptical of deliberative democracy
may be especially concerned about seeing the courts as the forum for
deliberation. The legislature or public meetings, the skeptics might
argue, are the proper venues for such deliberation. The function of
178. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 134
(2004) (describing deliberative democracy as a process of "seeking, not just any reasons,
but mutually justifiable reasons, and reaching a mutually binding decision. .. [for] those
reasons."); see also Ruben J. Garcia, Trasnationalism as a Social Movement Strategy: Insti-
tutions, Actors, and International Labor Standards, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3
(2003). See generally Jane Mansbridge, Conflict and Self-Interest in Deliberation, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 107, 107-32 (Samantha Besson & Jos6
Luis Marti eds., 2006); Anna-Maria Marshall, Social Movement Strategies and the Partici-
patory Potential of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 164, 164-81
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
179. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informa-
tional Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 215 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
180. LEIB, supra note 176, at 12-29.
181. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 178.
182. POSNER, supra note 23, at 16, 204-05.
183. Id. at 14.
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the courts in this view is to make decisions about the law with a
minimal amount of interference. While this might be an ideal vision
of courts, a legal realist appraisal of the courts accepts that judges
will be influenced by a number of different factors in their decision-
making. The virtue of greater amicus participation is that these in-
fluences are visible to those who wish to know them.
As described in his book, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy,
Judge Richard Posner criticizes deliberative democracy as a mode of
legislation and adjudication.1 8 Posner believes that "neither delib-
erative democracy on the left nor public choice theory on the right
represents a pragmatic theory of lawmaking."''1 5 Instead, Posner fa-
vors economist Joseph Schumpeter's vision of democracy, where el-
ites compete for votes and represent the interests of people who have
neither the time nor the ability to focus on matters of democratic
governance. 8 6 Posner believes that Schumpeterian democracy is both
normatively superior to other theories of democracy and the most ac-
curate description of American democracy today.8 7 Posner's pragma-
tist views of lawmaking and adjudication eschews grand theory for
practical consequentialist theories.'88
Posner's views of democracy align with his views toward amicus
participation. Posner's questioning of the value of more amicus par-
ties to judicial decisionmaking is consistent with his critique of delib-
erative democracy and public choice theories. As I have argued
above, both deliberative democracy and interest group theories add
something of value to judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, it is hard to
characterize American democracy as any one kind of democracy; it is
a blend of elite competition, public choice, and deliberative democ-
racy. Finally, it is difficult to see the application of Schumpeterian
theory to federal adjudication without elevating unelected judges to a
kind of super elite status that not even legislators have. Thus, espe-
cially in the federal context, amicus participation can provide an im-
portant channel of communication with the judiciary.
In summary, amicus participation can be viewed from a number of
different democratic perspectives, including participatory democracy,
popular constitutionalism, and deliberative democracy. As described
above, amicus participation can also be part of interest group politics.
The point of this Article, however, is to show that amicus participa-
tion can be a part of other visions of democracy as well.
184. Id. at 161.
185. Id. at 198.
186. Id. at 16-17.
187. Id. at 192-93 (describing Schumpeterian democracy as "competitive democracy").
188. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999) (highlighting Posner's pragmatist viewpoint).
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V. LET'S BE FRIENDS: BALANCING SCARCE JUDICIAL RESOURCES AND
ROBUST AMICUS PARTICIPATION
Having established above that amicus participation plays an im-
portant role in a democratic system, the question remains whether
the current rules concerning amicus briefs do enough to foster
amicus participation. There is no debate that caseloads in the federal
court system will continue to increase. 8 9 As a result, many judges
might wish for a more stringent standard than the one that is cur-
rently in place to limit the number of filings that they must sort
through. As discussed above, judges may impose additional require-
ments that are not specifically in the amicus rule in order to limit the
number of amicus briefs filed.1 90 On the other hand, the text of the
rule places a minimal standard on the filing of amicus briefs that
does not give much guidance to the court or the parties in terms of
what is acceptable.
While Judge Posner's concerns about the negative effects of
amicus briefs may be present in some cases, most of those who file
amicus briefs merely want to have their voices heard. However, there
is still a need for a more flexible standard for dealing with amicus
briefs than the current one. In this Part, I propose a new but familiar
standard that I think will better balance the interests at stake.
The controversial cases discussed above seem to lend support to
Judge Posner's concerns about amicus briefs being used as interest
group activity. Despite these recent examples, however, most courts
will likely continue to accept amicus briefs for filing without much
hesitation. Nevertheless, the continuing importance of amicus briefs
in the Supreme Court will heighten the tension between a relatively
open attitude toward amicus briefs and the more restrictive view es-
poused by Judge Posner. Because amicus filings are within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, the most likely sanction for an untoward
amicus brief is simply that it will not be accepted for filing. This,
coupled with the lack of sanctions imposed against attorneys for fil-
ing amicus briefs, suggests the need to look at the standard to make
it both easier to file meritorious amicus briefs and to punish the fil-
ing of frivolous amicus briefs.
189. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (examining the significance of the NAACP's
litigation campaign against segregated schools and its impact upon the theory and practice
of public interest law).
190. Compare Roy T. Englert, Jr., In Favor of Friends: Courts Find Gold in Those
Amicus Briefs, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 50, with Leslie T. Thornton, With Friends
Like These... the Weight of 90-plus Amicus Briefs in the Michigan Cases Ought to Influ-
ence the Court, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at 70.
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A. A Familiar Standard
The standards in FRCP 11 should be used to provide a better
threshold for the acceptance or rejection of amicus briefs.'9 ' FRCP 11
allows federal judges to sanction parties for briefs that are without
factual or legal support, brought in bad faith, or meant to harass.
The text of FRCP 11 could be applied to require amicus filers to cer-
tify that:
(1) [their brief] is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a
lack of information. 192
The four elements of FRCP 11 above would place a substantive
limitation on amicus briefs that is more understandable than the
current rule. The first clause takes care of amicus filers who have
improper purposes, and emphasizes that an amicus brief cannot har-
ass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. 193 This goes to the substantive motivations of the persons
filing the briefs. The second clause of the rule deals with the threat of
meritless filings. The factual allegations that are made by amicus fil-
ers should be testable by the court or the parties. 194
Under this new standard, the Graham-Kyl brief discussed earlier
might have been rejected for putting forth false evidence about the
legislative debate surrounding the Guantanamo detainees. 95 The re-
quirement in FRCP 1 1(a)(4) that litigants certify that denials of fac-
tual contentions are warranted will not often be relevant to amicus
191. One commentator has recognized the need for reform of amicus rules to balance
ethical advocacy with vigorous amicus participation. See Nancy Bage Sorensen, The Ethi-
cal Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Proposal for Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1219, 1262-63 (1999). Sorensen's focus was on the
ethical duty to disclose the financial supporters of amicus briefs toward greater transpar-
ency in Texas appellate practice. Id. While the proposal articulated here is broader than
Sorensen's, her proposal is also in keeping with the greater democratic transparency sup-
ported above.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(1)-(4).
193. Id. ll(b)(1).
194. Id. 11(b)(2).
195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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filers, since such filers do not generally deny factual contentions
made by the parties. Nevertheless, the court would have the inherent
discretion to decide whether or not cause exists to sanction amicus
filers.
The standards of FRCP 11 provide a sensible threshold for the fil-
ing of amicus briefs, although there has been some concern about the
negative consequences of FRCP 11 for parties to litigation. FRCP 11
has been criticized for creating a litigation process that is sometimes
used by parties as a cudgel against their counterparts. 196 This con-
cern is not pertinent to the standard that I propose here. Under this
standard, if an amicus brief lacks factual or legal support, the brief
will not be received by the court. The court could use its inherent dis-
cretion to decide whether to sanction parties in addition to refusing
their filings, but my use of the FRCP 11 standard does not presup-
pose that all parties whose briefs are rejected would also be sanc-
tioned. In practice, most parties whose amicus briefs are rejected
would probably not be sanctioned, except for those that are truly
egregious or vexatious. 197
Some might be concerned that a Rule 11 type standard will en-
courage gamesmanship and the satellite litigation that FRCP 11 has
spawned.' In other words, parties and other amicus filers might ex-
haust all their energies trying to prevent other parties from filing
amicus briefs. The response to this concern is that the current sys-
tem also encourages a certain amount of gamesmanship on the ques-
tion of whether the proposed amicus brief adds anything new to the
case. "'99 Also, Rule 11 may encourage such gamesmanship because of
the potential for attorneys' fees awards for successful moving par-
ties-something that the proposal that I envision would not auto-
matically contain, but which is certainly possible at the judge's dis-
cretion. 200
While application of my proposed standard may force inquiry into
the motive of those filing amicus briefs, that inquiry is possible even
196. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On-Federal Civil Rights
Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 vis-&-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power, 37
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 (2004).
197. Many states could also use the standard advocated here. For a good study of state
amicus rules, see Sarah F. Corbally & Donald C. Bross, A Practical Guide for Filing
Amicus Curiae Briefs in State Appellate Courts 6 tbl. 1 (2001), available at
http://www.naccchildlaw.org/documentslamicuspracticalguide.pdf.
198. See, e.g., George Cochran, The Reality of "A Last Victim" and Abuse of the Sanc-
tioning Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 693 (2004) (discussing how the possibility of fee
shifting under Rule 11 creates incentives for satellite litigation).
199. See, e.g., Hammond v. Junction City, No. 00-2146-JWL, 2001 WL 1665374, at *1-2
(D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2001) (granting the National Employment Lawyers Association's request
to participate as amicus curiae over the objections of the defendants that the brief "adds
nothing" and is "duplicative" of the plaintiffs efforts).
200. See Hart, supra note 196, at 658.
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under the current standards. Indeed, the point of this standard is to
discourage judges from too eagerly searching for bad motives on the
part of litigants. The standard is meant to look something like the"vexatious litigant" standard familiar to many judges. If amicus
briefs are not vexatious or plainly meritless, then they should proba-
bly be accepted for filing. While this might result in more amicus
briefs being filed, it is unlikely to significantly change the workload
of federal judges because, under the current rules, judges are still re-
quired to determine whether an amicus brief adds anything to the
arguments of the parties. Under the standard I propose here, there
may be more briefs filed but judges would spend less time going
through them to determine whether they "add anything new" to the
arguments already made by the parties; judges would simply be on
alert for any activity that suggests bad faith, which would not likely
be onerous.
The use of a FRCP 11-type standard for amicus briefs will clarify
what is expected of amicus filers. Other common parts of the rules on
amicus participation may serve important purposes and should be
retained. The rule that requires disclosure of any contributions or
payment of fees from the parties to the amici is important to prevent
parties with a greater number of resources from overpowering the
other parties in the litigation. There should not necessarily be a right
for wealthy parties to increase their already loud voices in the litiga-
tion if they are able to pay allies to appear as amici. Thus, the rules
on disclosure need not be eliminated. 20 1
Without having to show that a brief adds anything new, there
might be more amicus briefs filed. The magnitude of the increase is
uncertain, but an empirical question remains as to whether amicus
filings would increase markedly as a result of a change in the stan-
dard. It is far from clear that the current rules are preventing many
amicus briefs from being filed, but there is a chance that amicus fil-
ings might increase.
This is not to say that courts cannot seek more information about
those who file amicus briefs. The identity of those who fund amicus
briefs in some cases might be necessary for judges to know whether
they need to recuse themselves, and many courts have this sort of
rule for parties. 20 2 The U.S. Supreme Court and some federal appel-
late courts require disclosure of whether the amici are receiving
201. See Sorensen, supra note 191, at 1257-58.
202. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 29, available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules/
LR29.pdf ("The Court ordinarily will deny leave to file a brief for an amicus curiae where,
by reason of a relationship between a judge who would hear the proceeding and the amicus
or counsel for the amicus, the filing of the brief would cause the recusal of the judge.").
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compensation from any party to the lawsuit for filing the brief.20 3
This rule allows the courts to know the full extent of "interest group
activity" and to know whether the judges have a financial interest in
the litigation or a connection to one of the parties. There may be
other ways in which judges can know exactly who is funding litiga-
tion, such as at the filing of the complaint, but all of this transpar-
ency would serve to blunt much of the criticism of amicus briefs as
interest group activity. In many ways, amicus briefs are more trans-
parent than traditional forms of lobbying.
B. Concerns About Scientific Evidence
There might be a concern that amicus filers will try to introduce
evidence, sometimes social science evidence, which has not been vet-
ted through the trial court. Indeed, some of the most notable uses of
amicus briefs have brought social science evidence to the attention of
the court. The question of whether judges will be beguiled by false
social science evidence is a concern, but judges give little weight to
social science evidence not presented to the trial court. Some attor-
neys may use amicus briefs as an end-run around the stricter evi-
dence rules mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.10 4 In Daubert, the United States
Supreme Court set the parameters for the admission of scientific evi-
dence in the trial courts. Basically, the trial court must first deter-
mine whether the expert's opinion constitutes scientific knowledge,
and then determine whether the opinion logically advances a mate-
rial aspect of the offering party's case.2 °5 The question of whether im-
properly vetted evidence will be relied upon by appellate courts is a
persistent one and is a larger question than just having to do with
amicus briefs.
There is certainly the possibility for the use of scientific evidence
in amicus briefs. A recent example of this was the Supreme Court de-
cision in Gonzales v. Carhart.20 6 This case tested the constitutionality
of the Congressional ban on partial birth abortion, which the Court
upheld by a 5-4 vote. 20 7 The Court deferred to congressional findings
about the intact dilation procedure, in order to hold that the proce-
dure was never medically necessary. 20 In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Anthony Kennedy pointed to another reason for the ruling,
203. SUP. CT. R. 37(6); see also Tony Mauro, High Court's New Rules Address Critics'
Privacy Concerns, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=l 184663196330.
204. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
205. Id. at 597.
206. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
207. See id.
208. Id. at 1638.
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which he could apply to all abortions: '"While we find no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained."0 9 For this proposition, Justice Kennedy
cites the amicus brief of Sandra Cano and others filed by the Justice
Foundation, a conservative group. 210
The evidence provided for "abortion trauma syndrome" in Cano's
amicus brief is at best anecdotal, and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation recognizes no such disorder. 211 It is also notable that evidence
of this condition was not submitted in the lower courts. 212 The Court
nonetheless seemed to endorse as an alternative reason a scientific
conclusion for which there is considerable doubt. The submission of
scientific evidence of doubtful validity could have a negative impact
on the ability of other parties to present empirical evidence, but
courts should instead scrutinize such submissions carefully to deter-
mine whether further information is needed. 21 3
While the amicus brief in Gonzales likely did not play a disposi-
tive role in the outcome, it lent some support to the result that the
Court reached. In fact, Justice Kennedy had dissented from the
Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart seven years earlier, where the
Court struck down Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute because
it did not have an exception for the health and safety of the
mother.214 Nevertheless, the amicus brief in Gonzales, containing
over a hundred pages of one-paragraph affidavits from a number of
women who in most cases were identified only by their initials, sup-
ports the central premise of this Article toward greater public par-
ticipation in the courts.
There have been other recent examples of amicus briefs that have
included the voices of many people affected by the decision. In the
University of Michigan affirmative action cases, a brief was filed by
13,922 law students from around the country in support of the law
209. Id. at 1634.
210. Id.
211. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg called abortion trauma syndrome an "antiabortion
shibboleth," even while acknowledging that regret may be part of any woman's decision to
have an abortion. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1648 (citing to numerous authorities refuting the
existence of the syndrome); Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Re-
alities, 9 GUTIMACHER POLY REV. 3, 8 (2006); Nada L. Stotland, M.D., Letter to the Editor,
The Abortion Issue: Who Decides, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2007, at A14.
212. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.
2006); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N. D. Cal. 2004).
213. See Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Cu-
riae Briefs, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 9 (1991); see also Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science:
Medical, Scientific, and Technical Amici Before the Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 789,
797-802 (2000).
214. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
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school's affirmative action program. 215 This sort of brief seems to be
more along the lines of a petition but it did communicate to the Court
that a large number of individuals would be affected by the decision.
The students' amicus brief was not cited by any of the justices in
their opinions in the case.216 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
University of Michigan law school's efforts to enroll a critical mass of
diverse students did not violate the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.217
In contrast, the amicus brief discussed above in Gonzales was
seeking to use the affidavits of the women who regretted having
abortions to argue for the existence of a medical condition that had
little relevance to the central issue in the case-whether the intact
dilation procedure was ever medically necessary. 2 8 Unlike the stu-
dents' brief in the University of Michigan cases, the Justice Founda-
tion's brief was cited favorably by Justice Kennedy.219 Studies of the
effect of social science evidence in the courts show that judges most
often seek information from amici in the scientific fields.220 One study
of a state supreme court showed that the justices took sixty percent
of their citations to empirical research from the record, briefs, and
amicus briefs.221
With respect to amicus briefs in the trial courts, there is always
the opportunity for the judge to seek testimony from experts who
submit amicus briefs in court, which would presumably be tested in
accordance with the Daubert standard discussed above. In the appel-
late courts, judges can exercise considerably wider discretion to de-
cide when scientific evidence is credible or not. Thus, if some "junk
science" comes into an appellate decision through an amicus brief, it
is primarily the fault of the judge or the parties in failing to debunk
215. See Brief of 13,922 Current Law Students at Accredited American Law Schools as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/gru-amicus-
ussc/um/LSDHE-gru.pdf.
216. In contrast, the amicus briefs of corporations and educational associations were
amongst those cited more than ten separate times by Justice O'Connor in her majority
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
217. For a discussion of the social science evidence marshaled by amicus filers to sup-
port the diversity rationale in the Michigan cases, see Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or
Proof- The Social Science Justification for the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761, 796-97 (2006).
218. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
219. Id.
220. See generally ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA JAMES SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 32 (1998); John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and
Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993); J.
Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psy-
chology, 66 IND. L.J. 136 (1990).
221. Monahan & Walker, supra note 220, at 487 n.35.
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it. As a result, a fear of junk science is not a reason to limit the abil-
ity of parties to raise scientific studies in their briefs.
C. The Duties of Judges in Handling Amicus Briefs
A more liberal standard for accepting amicus briefs might place a
greater burden on judges and encourage them to be selective in
which briefs they read. This effect should be treated with concern,
but this concern should not be overstated. After all, the current rules
leave room for judges to pick and choose among different parties'
briefs. Under Canon 3 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
"[a] judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law.1222 The rule
suggests that if a judge grants leave to file an amicus brief, the brief
should be given the same attention that any other properly filed brief
is given.
Despite the best efforts of judges to fairly evaluate all amicus
briefs, there will be limits to how much attention they can give a
flood of amicus briefs. In denying leave to file the amicus briefs,
Judge Posner correctly pointed out that "[flit would [be improper] for
[a judge] to permit the filing of an [amicus] brief and then not read it
... (or [leave it to] clerks to read it). ' '223 In the end, however, it would
be up to writers of the briefs to make a convincing case early on in
the brief as to why their arguments should be given attention.
Although amicus filers are unlikely to file constitutional chal-
lenges if their amicus briefs are rejected, there are constitutional due
process dimensions to the denial of leave to file an amicus brief.
While judges may have ethical obligations to parties, judges do not
have due process obligations to amicus filers. This is because the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require
procedural due process only for those whose "life, liberty, or property"
is under threat of deprivation.224 Despite this, there are First
Amendment dimensions to amicus participation that warrant atten-
tion. Moreover, the question of whether nonlawyers have a right to
file amicus briefs also raises important constitutional issues.
The more liberal standard for allowing the filing of amicus briefs
in this Article is not intended to place unreasonable burdens on
judges or the courts. Nor is it intended to give clerks inordinate
power.225 Instead, this Article seeks to extend the minimal due proc-
222. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.200(c), 8.520(f) ("any person" may file an application for
amicus participation).
223. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 2000).
224. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
225. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus
Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004).
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ess consideration afforded party litigants to amicus filers. While
some might argue that a more liberal standard for amicus briefs
would place an unreasonable burden on the courts, the claim must be
evaluated in terms of the burden that currently exists on judges to
decide whether the amicus brief presented for filing adds anything
new to the arguments already presented by the parties. The standard
favored in this Article would actually lessen the burden on judges to
make the determination of whether anything new was added by the
amicus briefs. This standard probably represents the current reality
because most amicus briefs are accepted for filing. Thus, the stan-
dard proposed here should not markedly increase the burden on the
courts.
Of course, some judges might already use sorting techniques to al-
locate their scarce time to read briefs. A recent analysis of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's decisions, for example, shows that she cited
most often to the briefs of prestigious professional associations, the
Solicitor General, and the states.226 Another study suggests that the
Justices might favor the amicus briefs of large institutional play-
ers.22 7
In the end, judges will use a variety of methods to deal with their
increasing workloads. In a recent article, former Supreme Court
clerks acknowledged that justices often separate amicus briefs based
on their authors.228 Justice Ginsburg, for example, has stated that
her chambers divides piles of briefs between "must-read," "skim," and"skip" categories. 229 There is a good chance that other Supreme Court
justices and federal judges use similar sorting techniques. There is
also a chance that some judges will use denial of leave to file as a
sorting technique.
One of the most prominent objections to a more liberal standard
toward amicus briefs is the institutional burden more amicus briefs
would place on the courts. Justice Ginsburg's "pile system" suggests
that judges will find ways to deal with any increase in briefs filed.
Some might rightfully be concerned that this would lead judges to
discriminate even more than they already do based on the persons or
entities filing the briefs. There are several responses to this argu-
ment. First, it seems unlikely that even a different standard for ac-
cepting amicus briefs will markedly increase the number of amicus
briefs filed. Second, judges are likely to use various techniques to sort
information similar to those used to sort briefs filed by parties, such
226. Ruth Colker, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Friends, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517
(2007).
227. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 749-50.
228. Lynch, supra note 225, at 52-54.
229. Tony Mauro, Bench Pressed, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 15, 2005, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113296708400.
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as the reputation of the lawyers filing the briefs or the viewpoint of
the party filing the briefs. This is not a reason to limit the number of
participants to litigation, but rather to encourage judges to give a fair
hearing to all parties.
Increased amicus participation will have a democratizing influ-
ence on the litigation process because, as stated above, it is often
more cost effective for social movements to make their voices heard
as amicus parties than as parties bringing litigation.2 30 The question
of whether more amicus briefs would lead judges to give less atten-
tion to the briefs filed by parties if more amicus briefs are filed re-
mains unanswered. While there are institutional limits on the num-
ber of briefs that courts can handle, the focus should be on the mini-
mal attention that judges give litigants. This points us to the mini-
mal due process standards that should be afforded to all litigants.
Even under the current amicus rules, there will be a limit to the pa-
tience of judges regarding a large number of amicus briefs.
If the standard proposed in this Article is adopted, there might be
an increase in the number of amicus briefs that are filed. If that oc-
curs, the need for self-regulation of the profession will be more im-
portant.231 As a strategic matter, it is in the interest of amicus filers
to form coalitions to maximize their impact before the court. Thus,
any increase in amicus filings will probably be offset by the increased
coalition building among large and small groups such as We Make
the Road by Walking, Inc., a social service group for immigrants on
which filed an amicus brief in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, discussed above.23 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Because American courts are the locus for decisions with vast po-
litical, social, and economic implications, it is understandable that
there is increasing pressure for the public's voice to be heard in the
judicial process. As this occurs, there will likely be pressure to regu-
late and limit the number of amicus filings to ensure that judges are
not unduly burdened by a large number of briefs, and to screen out
frivolous arguments. The current system, which largely allows indi-
vidual judges to decide which briefs to accept, will need to be modi-
230. This can be seen in the number of smaller groups that have filed amicus briefs in
the Supreme Court in recent years, such as Make the Road by Walking, a social service
group for immigrants on Long Island, New York, which filed an amicus brief in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
231. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regula-
tion: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA.
L. REV. 1167 (2003) (exploring possible changes in lawyer regulation and concluding that
legislative oversight would be most effective).
232. See supra Part IV.A.
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fled to provide guidelines that will maximize democratic participa-
tion without being unduly burdensome for judges. In this Article, I
argue for a new standard based on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure that would be more in keeping with both pluralist and delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy.
The standard that I propose here balances concerns about an in-
crease in amicus briefs with the important implications for the
American democratic system. The new amicus rule I propose, bor-
rowed from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, still gives judges
the opportunity to reject amicus briefs that are frivolous or filed in
bad faith. I believe this standard will better serve the goals of
broader participation in the legal system. More amicus participation
may also increase the faith in the judicial system that is eroding in
some quarters today. With a more liberal standard, litigants will con-
tinue to band together in groups and associations in order to maxi-
mize their impact on the court.
Amicus participation likely will continue to increase, irrespective
of the rules applied to amicus briefs. As amicus participation in-
creases, I predict that the rules on amicus participation, which thus
far have been minor obstacles to the filing of most amicus briefs, will
be used as gatekeepers more frequently. Ultimately, in my view,
judges will continue to be the gatekeepers and filters. Current
amicus rules can be modified to limit only the most vexatious par-
ticipation. A new standard for the acceptance of amicus filings in this
respect would be more in keeping with both pluralist and delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy.
The continually increasing caseloads of the federal courts will
sharpen the tension between the need for greater access to the courts
for nonparties and the prevention of diluted adjudication. As with
many current controversies, these tensions should be resolved with
some overarching democratic principles in mind. On one hand,
amicus filers may burden the courts. Yet, amicus participation is an
important part of the democratic process, as I have argued above.
This is why I argue for a different standard for courts to use in decid-
ing whether to accept amicus briefs for filing. I think this standard
will be both easier to apply and also focus in on the real concerns-
frivolous filings. Debates about deliberative democracy will continue.
The role of litigation and the judiciary in defining the contours of our
democracy will continue to be part of this discourse.
